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Key Ideas 
 Monetary and debt developments in the G7 countries point to relatively sluggish growth 
but do not signal deflation risks. 
 The realignment of ‘internal real exchange rates’ in the euro area will most likely come 
through a rise in prices in Germany (and a few other stronger countries). 
 The lessons learned in the early 1930s have made a come-back of deflation quite 
unlikely. 
ith inflation rates in both the US and the euro area falling to new post-
recession lows, fears of deflation have re-emerged. In the US an eventually 
inevitable adjustment to the Fed’s purchases of US Treasury and mortgage 
bonds is creating concerns that a possible tightening of financial conditions in 
response to the ‘tapering’ of the purchases could stifle the upswing and push 
inflation even lower. In the euro area, there are fears that deflation as a result of a 
sluggish recovery coupled with the need of weaker countries to regain external 
competitiveness against stronger countries through wage and price cuts would again 
lead to doubts in financial markets about the solvency of governments and banks in 
the highly indebted, weaker countries of the currency union. 
In this note we take a look at the development of monetary aggregates and debt in 
the G7 (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan), plus non-G7 euro-area 
countries, which have an important bearing on the future development of price 
levels. We also discuss the problem of restoring external competitiveness in the 
weaker euro-area countries without aggravating their debt burden. Our key 
conclusions are i) monetary and debt developments in the G7 countries point to 
relatively sluggish growth but do not signal deflation risks; and ii) the realignment of 
‘internal real exchange rates’ in the euro area will most likely come through a rise in 
prices in Germany (and a few other stronger countries). The lessons learned in the 
early 1930s have made a come-back of deflation quite unlikely. 
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Lessons learned… 
A considerable part of economic research over the last 80 years has been devoted to 
the analysis of the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The most famous verdict on 
this case came from Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz.1 They argued that the Fed 
had failed to protect the economy from deflation and depression by allowing broad 
money to drop. They did not replace ‘inside money’ (created by banks) that was 
destroyed by credit contraction in the wake of bankruptcies with ‘outside money’ 
(created by the central bank) and hence allowed the US economy to be suffocated by 
the credit and money collapse. 
We have written extensively on the performance of credit during the Great 
Depression and provide here only some additional evidence on monetary 
developments.2 As can be seen from Figure 1, the broad money stock M2 dropped 
sharply (by altogether 35%) between the end of 1929 and the middle of 1932. This led 
to a sharp contraction of the ‘Marshallian K’, the ratio of money to GDP (Figure 2).3 K 
is a simple measure of the tightness of money supply: a fall indicates the possibility 
of an economic contraction due to a shortage of money; a rise opens the possibility of 
an economic expansion owing to an abundance of money. 
 
Figure 1. Money and real GDP in the US during the 1920s and 1930s 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
                                                     
1 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. 
2 See, for instance, Michael Biggs and Thomas Mayer, “Bring credit back into the monetary 
policy framework!”, PEFM Policy Brief, Political Economy of Financial Markets programme, 
St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, August 2013. 
3 We used here real GDP for the calculation of K, as a vicious circle of deflation expectations 
led to an even greater fall in nominal GDP than real GDP or M2. 
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Figure 2. Marshallian K in the US during the 1920s and 1930s 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
Another example of the failure of a central bank to protect the economy from the 
destruction of inside money in the wake of a financial crisis is Japan in the early 
1990s. As can be seen from Figure 3, the monetary base dropped significantly relative 
to nominal GDP between the second quarter of 1989 and the first quarter of 1992 
(although it increased moderately in absolute terms during this period). The decline 
in the base relative to GDP translated into a decline in the Marshallian K with a lag of 
about half a year. Reflecting the tightening of the money supply, Japanese inflation 
fell from 4.2% in November 1990 to 0.4% in March 1995. 
Figure 3. Monetary base in Japan during the 1990s (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
Figure 4. Marshallian K in Japan 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
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In contrast to the developments in the 1930s and early 1990s, central banks this time 
were quick to replace destroyed inside money by outside money so as to avoid a 
similar drop in the Marshallian K. This can be seen from Figure 5, which shows the 
development of the monetary base (i.e. the central bank money stock consisting of 
banknotes and deposits held by banks with the central bank) relative to nominal 
GDP since the early 2000s. Following the adoption of a policy of ‘quantitative easing’ 
(buying of government bonds) in 2001, the monetary base grew relative to GDP in 
Japan through 2002-03, but it dropped again in 2006. However, with the beginning of 
the financial crisis in 2007, the monetary base of other central banks expanded 
sharply. The ECB started early, but the expansion remained fairly moderate until the 
end of 2011, when the bank flooded the banking system with term liquidity. With 
some confidence in the sustainability of EMU returning following ECB President 
Mario Draghi’s declaration that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to protect it, 
the base declined again. 
Figure 5. Development of the monetary base in G7 countries 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
The Fed and the Bank of England engaged in a massive base expansion as of the 
middle of 2008. The Fed’s expansion occurred in several waves (rounds of 
quantitative easing) whereas the expansion of the Bank of England came in two big 
steps. The Bank of Japan followed initially in a more gradual way but has recently 
moved to a more forceful base expansion. The only G7 central bank showing 
restraint in base expansion was the Bank of Canada. 
The expansion of the monetary base more than made up for the reduction of the 
credit and money multipliers caused by the banking crisis and led to a rise in the 
Marshallian K in all countries following the beginning of the financial crisis (Figure 
6). The US already engaged in more substantial money expansion in the early 2000s, 
but lowered the ratio of broad money to GDP as of 2003. K expanded again as of 2007 
and presently stands about 60% above its 2000 level. The expansion was more 
aggressive in the UK, where despite a correction in 2010-12, K presently is almost 
70% above its 2000 level. In the euro area, K peaked in early 2009 and is presently up 
43% relative to 2000. Despite little movement in the monetary base, K expanded in 
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Canada to a level (relative to 2000) similar to that in the euro area. It seems that 
Canadian credit and money multipliers have not suffered much during the financial 
crisis so that a rise in K could be achieved through traditional monetary policy 
measures. By contrast, the expansion of K in Japan has been more closely linked to 
the development of the monetary base relative to GDP. 
Figure 6. Marshallian K in the G7 countries 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
…leaves debt at elevated levels 
The expansion of base money and the Marshallian K prevented a repeat of the 
experience of the 1930s. At the same time, however, it also prevented a more 
aggressive reduction of credit and debt. In part, the expansion of broad money 
relative to GDP was the result of a higher preference for liquid assets after the 
financial crisis. But it also reflected the stabilisation and, in some cases, further 
expansion of credit. This can be seen when we look at the item equivalent to total 
domestic credit on the liability side of the balance sheet, namely total domestic debt. 
As can be seen from Figure 7, the financial crisis stopped the fast run-up of debt 
relative to GDP around 2009 in most countries. However, except the moderate 
decline observed since then in the US, debt ratios have been stable or have increased 
further, albeit at a lower speed. The debt ratio has moved sideways in Canada and 
the UK, where it has been at the highest (relative to its 2000 level) of all countries 
considered. But the debt ratio has slowly crept higher in the euro area and Japan. In 
the former region, it still stands more than 40% above its level of early 2000. 
Thus, the corollary of the avoidance of a slump in money supply (and K) like in the 
1930s was a delay or slowdown of deleveraging. This was achieved in part by the 
public sector offsetting the de-leveraging of the private sector. This helped to avoid a 
sharper contraction, but is now probably also preventing a more rigorous recovery as 
public and private households still struggle with heavy debt loads. Perhaps it is not a 
coincidence that within the G7 countries economic recovery seems most robust in the 
US where de-leveraging has progressed the most. The situation still seems most 
precarious in the euro area, where total debt still seems to be rising relative to GDP. 
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Figure 7. Total domestic debt in the G7 countries 
 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
Preventing regional deflation… 
Neither the development of the monetary base nor of the Marshallian K would point 
to deflation risks in the euro area. Moreover, the decline of headline inflation recently 
below 1% is more likely to echo the past recession than to foreshadow worse to come. 
Just as in July 2009, when it dropped to -0.6%, it is likely to edge up again on the back 
of the nascent economic recovery. However, when we focus on the crisis countries 
within the euro area, deflation risks become more visible. Table 1 gives the October 
2013 headline inflation rate for the euro area in total, the GIIPS group of countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), the GIPS group (GIIPS without Italy) and 
the member country with the lowest inflation rate of all. Clearly, the worse off 
countries are the lower is their inflation rate. 
Table 1. Euro area consumer price inflation, October 2013 
Euro area GIIPS GIPS Greece 
0.7% 0.2% -0.3% -1.9% 
Source: Haver Analytics. 
The data of Table 1 should come as no surprise. The countries in trouble experienced 
higher labour cost and price growth than the countries that are now economically 
stronger. This has led to an appreciation of their ‘internal real exchange rate’, which 
now needs to be corrected. For this to happen, costs and prices in the crisis countries 
must decline relative to those in other countries, notably Germany. Since both wages 
and prices in Germany do not seem to be grossly misaligned, it would seem that 
devaluation in the other countries should occur by a decline in wages and prices 
there. However, a larger drop in the price level in these countries would raise the real 
value of the outstanding private and public debt and bring back concerns about the 
solvency of governments and banks. Against this background it seems likely that the 
majority of ECB Council members would prefer regional relative price adjustments 
to come about by more inflation in the stronger countries instead of deflation in the 
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weaker ones. This is possible without the ECB missing its aggregate inflation goal for 
the euro area as a whole. To illustrate the case, consider the following scenario: 
Inflation runs at 5.7% in Germany and 0.5% in all other countries. With German 
inflation entering the euro-area’s harmonised inflation rate with a weight of 27%, the 
euro-area inflation rate would amount to 1.9%, in line with the ECB’s goal of an 
increase in the price level of close to but below 2%. 
…leads to questions about the distributional impact of monetary 
policy 
The consequences of monetary policy action for the distribution of wealth between 
creditors and debtors were hardly discussed before the financial crisis. Assuming 
that the business cycle leads policy rates to follow a sine curve, they are indeed 
immaterial. Gains by debtors when rates are low are offset by gains by creditors 
when rates are high so that the distributional effects even out over the cycle. 
However, when rates stay low for a very long period of time, the distributional 
effects can become an issue. Even worse, since Germany is a large net lender to other 
EMU countries, negative real rates in Germany over an extended period of time force 
a wealth transfer from German creditors to debtors in other countries. This raises a 
number of questions over the democratic legitimacy of a monetary policy that 
induces such a wealth transfer: 
Has the ECB Council been given the right to induce real wealth transfers among 
EMU member countries? Article 125 of the EU Treaty, which forbids ‘bail-outs’ of 
financially troubled countries, would seem to say no. 
What is the democratic legitimacy of the Council’s decision? According to the ECB’s 
statutes, Council Members should pursue price stability for the euro area as a whole 
and not the interests of their home countries. 
How well do the members of the Council represent the constituency of the ECB, i.e. 
the inhabitants of ‘Euroland’? Germany’s population of 82 million can appoint two of 
their nationals to the Council, the same number as 1.3 million Cypriot and Maltese 
citizens. 
Disagreement between a German-led minority and the majority in the ECB’s Council 
over the latest rate cut suggests that these questions are beginning to play an 
increasing role for the common monetary policy in the future. 
Forward or backward? 
Political conflicts over the distributional effects of monetary policy can be 
democratically resolved only if EMU is complemented by Political Union, as 
originally envisaged by the founding fathers of EMU. But as the pooling of national 
sovereignty in a Political Union was rejected, EMU was created along the lines of a 
gold-standard regime: Money was to be issued by a central bank far removed from 
politics and committed to price stability as its single goal coupled with national 
sovereignty and liability in all other policy areas. But a gold-standard regime is an 
inherently open system: countries can go bankrupt and leave the system when they 
mismanage their economies. 
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Since political leaders and monetary policymakers did not want to accept these 
consequences, they decided in mid-2012 to give the ECB the function of a lender of 
last resort to governments. This eliminated the threat of sovereign bankruptcies and 
exits from EMU, but at the same time changed the nature of EMU from the gold 
standard model to a model in which money can be created by a ‘state central bank’ as 
a liability of the state, i.e., a ‘state debt money system’. But without a state established 
democratically through Political Union, this construction is unstable. Sovereign states 
will not accept orders from the Brussels bureaucracy with regard to economic and 
fiscal policy and they will reject Germany assuming a hegemonic role in EMU to 
enforce the orders. Germany, on the other hand, will question wealth redistribution 
implied by the common monetary policy. Hence, to stabilise EMU, policymakers will 
have either to move forward and create Political Union, or move backward and 
return to the platform of an open gold standard. If they can neither go forward nor 
backward, EMU is likely to unravel over time into national or regional currency 
areas. 
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